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At the start of December, the U.S. President brought together the heads of state of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to sign a peace deal. The commitment involved an end to decades of conflict in the volatile eastern DRC, presenting it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to unlock economic gains.

Shortly after, however, a completely opposite strategy for instability emerged. The administration announced that U.S. forces had executed Christmas Day airstrikes in a region of Nigeria, hitting sites linked to the Islamic State (IS). On a online platform, the President declared, “I have previously warned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

An Evident Strategic Pivot

These divergent actions exemplifies the core principle of the U.S. engagement with sub-Saharan Africa in this administration: a moving away from championing democracy and human rights in favor of a avowed focus on economic deals and ending wars—despite the fact that this squares with the new military strikes in Nigeria remains to be seen.

“Our view has shifted from Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a mantra commonly used for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” declared a senior U.S. diplomat during a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A White House representative echoed this, saying the President “has treated Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American investment, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations achieve stability, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Consequences and Inconsistencies

This shift is significant, but experts caution it is premature to gauge its impact. The approach is influenced by the President’s unconventional diplomacy, which has included disputes with long-standing U.S. partners and negative rhetoric towards Africans.

“The guiding idea is, if it’s in the long-term or short-term interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” said an analyst for Africa studies at a prominent foreign policy council.

Notable policy moves have included:

• Shutting down the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. A study forecasts this could lead to millions of additional deaths globally by 2030, with a significant portion in Africa.
• Implementing visa restrictions on citizens from numerous African countries and halting most refugee admissions.
• Implementing a global tariff campaign that has harmed African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Letting a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

International Neglect and Friction

Differing from his immediate predecessors, the President did not travel to sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His best-known engagement with African affairs was referring to nations on the continent with a derogatory term, which he later admitted using.

“Africa sits at dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for the President, but for the administration in general,” said the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which gave only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A significant dispute has erupted with South Africa, reportedly shaped by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The claim of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa aligns beautifully now in U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” noted a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Transactional Relations and Conditional Action

An analogous tension appeared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This collided with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation composed between Christians and Muslims and riven with security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts noted that the forceful rhetoric may have spurred the government into greater action on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had approved the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

Trump has made no secret his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has brokered in the Congo conflict and dispatched a diplomat to try to end the fighting in Sudan’s civil war, to date without success. While the Congo deal appeared to have been broken quickly, it “at least serves to introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” noted one conflict expert.

An Echo of Competitors

Observers characterize the new U.S. approach as similar to that of global rivals like Russia and China, who have deepened their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on commercial interests.

“It’s a long overdue recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” said one foreign policy analyst.

Realistically, the revised strategy likely means that “a state that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The involvement that we are talking about does not seek to spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a quid-pro-quo posture towards Africa,” the observer stated.